Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror

Good Muslim, Bad Muslim largely explores the Soviet-Afghan war from the American perspective. It is therefore worth considering the Soviet Union’s own motivations for invading Afghanistan, motivations which mirror many of the US’s motivations. For the Soviet Union, the war was deeply rooted in geopolitical calculations, concerns over regional stability, and a commitment to preserving influence in a strategically important neighbor. What began as a limited intervention evolved into a drawn-out, brutal conflict that severely strained the Soviet military, economy, and international reputation. The war’s outcome contributed significantly to the unraveling of the Soviet system and marked a turning point in late 20th-century global politics.

From the Soviet point of view, the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was driven by a complex mix of ideological, strategic, and security considerations. In April 1978, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist-Leninist party aligned with the USSR, seized power in a coup known as the Saur Revolution. The new government, under Nur Muhammad Taraki and later Hafizullah Amin, implemented radical reforms inspired by socialist principles. These reforms were deeply unpopular with much of Afghan society, especially in the rural and religious populations. Resistance began to mount, and the country quickly descended into chaos.